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III. Absolute Power and Scientific Knowledge ut in pluribus 
How does the account of God's ordinate and absolute power, which 
strongly affects our moral knowledge and our understanding of divine jus-
tice and relationship to a humanly dimensioned world, affect our knowledge 
of the natural universe? 1 There is a claim about this in Rep. exam. I d. 44 
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' Although my main concern is with God's omnipotence and absolute power and 
how they affect our knowledge of the world, it is challenging to think whether absolute 
power, as the power of altering any existing order of moral/legal and natural rules, can 
affect the knowledge that God has of objects. This kind of doubt is raised in Rep. exam. 
Id. 44 q. 1 n:2 (ed. Soder: 190): "Item, sua potentia non excedit suam sdentiam, maxime 
quoad obiecta; sed secundum suam scientiam non potest scire opposita aliter quam scit; 
ergo nee potest a1iter producere vel opposita quam producit". It is affirmed there that 
God's potency does not exceed His science -where His knowledge of everything seems 
to be determinate-, and that holds especially with respect to objects. J. R. Siider, 
-0-bersetzungen und Anmerkungen, in: Johannes Duns Scotus, op. cit., p. 191, translates 
as following: "Ferner: Gottes Macht iibertrifft nicht sein Wissen, besonders da sich beide 
auf [dieselben] Objekte richten". It seems that God's science cannot know "opposite 
things" [opposita] differently than how it actually knows them - realized•or-unrealized, 
true-or-false, etc. If, then, what God can. actually produce depends on His actual knowl-
edge, God cannot produce things differently, or produce things opposite to what He ac-
tually produces. Scotus confirms that "potency" [potential and "knowledge" [scientia] 
"equally apply" !coaequantur] in what concerns objects, for everything than can be done 
can be known. Scotus's answer stays at the level of possibility. But the equality at the 
level of producibilia in a general sense and knowledge does not concern everything in 
every way. (1) It does not need to be the case that to everything to which a potency "ac-
tu" l]y" relates, the other potency has to relate too. The reason is that it does not have 
to oe the case that, for every object that is object of the potency "in act", there is also a 
knowledge "in act". See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 15 (ed. Soder; 198): "Ad secundum dico 
quad potentia et scientia coaequantur quantum ad obiecta, quia omne quod potest fieri 
potest sciri. Sed non oportet quod coaequantur quantum ad omnia et omni modo. Non 
oportet enim quad cuiuscumque sit unum actualiter et aliud, quia non oportet quod 
cuiuscumque, cuius est potentia in actu, sit scientia in actu; ( .. .)". Scotus is assuming 
that many objects of the potency in actu are not realized, are simply not the case, and 
are pure possibilities - but they are the objects of the potency in actu. And there is a sec-
ond reason for the non-equality between potency or producibilia and knowledge. (2) "Sci-
entific knowledge" of any object is of that object only "actually" as long as it is "in act". 
Of course strict knowledge relates to what has a determinate truth value, and to-be-the-
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q. 1 n. 17. Recall that in I d. 44 q. 1 n. 4, the argument is that if a power like 
the power of God can produce things differently than actually produced, 
then it can move "celestial bodies" differently than it moves them now. As 
a consequence, celestial bodies can be combined differently than how they 
are now combined. "Geometry"/"astronomy", the scientific knowledge that 
deals with the conjunction of heavenly bodies as they are now, should there-
fore not count as a "necessary science", i.e., a knowledge of what is always 
true or "whose objects are necessary". "Astronomy" would rather be a 
knowledge of things that can happen differently and thus concern contin-
gent things, as previously defined. 
Scotus admits that geometry/astronomy is not a scientia that is "abso-
lutely necessary" (simpliciter n.ecessaria). The difference between absolute 
necessity and non-absolute necessity - already known to Aristotle - was 
also put forward in Rep. exam. I d. 42 2• Recognizing the small difference be-
tween absolute power and omnipotence, those two necessities are more 
directly connected here to the account of the absolute power of the omnipo-
tent being: 
AN def.: Absolute necessity is the immutable and permanently valid charac-
ter of a universal moral truth and/or of the movement of a heavenly body, by 
itself or in a conjunction, where such a valid character cannot logically-meta-
physically be changed by an absolute power. 
Since an absolute necessity in respect to the second part of the defini-
tion cannot obtain, a revised definition is needed: 
AN def. 2 : Absolute necessity is the immutable and permanently valid charac-
ter of a universal moral truth, where such a valid character cannot logically-
metaphysically be changed by an absolute power. 
And 
N-AN def.: Non-absolute necessity is the permanently valid character of a 
universal moral truth and/or of the movement of a heavenly body, by itself or 
in a conjunction, but it is nonetheless a valid character that can logically-meta-
physically be changed by the absolute power of an omnipotent being. 
In both definitions we could change "of a heavenly body" to "of a body 
of physical nature". Scotus can now affirm directly that geometry/as-
tronomy is only a science "for the most part of the cases" (ut in pluribus 
tantum). The happenings in nature - and indeed nature's regular happen-
ings - occur with divine permission. God allows that things operate (and 
case is for a cognized object to-be-true. But potency is also of the possible object that is 
not "actually" or ''in act". Potency, as we learn from the discussion on synchronic con-
tingency of a will's act, relates also to the purely possible - not knowable as being-the-
case. See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 15 (ed. Soder: 198): "( ... ); quia scientia cuiuscumque 
est eius actualiter ut actu est, potentia autem est obiecti possibilis quad non est 
actualiter". 
2 See R.H. Pich, Onipotencia e conhecimento cientifico, in: C. A. Lertora-Mendoza 
(coord.), op. cit., p. 1-17. 
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cause) "in the most cases" (ut in pluribus) according to the movements they 
have and so according to the order that was disposed by Him. An operation 
"in the most cases" is actually a nomological operation, as a regularity 
settled according to an ordinate power. But since God has absolute power 
and therefore power to change any given order - which is per defi,nitionem 
something changeable because contingent - sometimes He sets aside the 
instituted order and decides to validate a new one, so that, as a conse-
quence, things in nature happen (or "move") differently. Before offering a 
more definite formulation for such a knowledge, it is important to realize 
that in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1- differently than in Rep exam. I d. 42 q. 2 -
Scotus offers, by way of theological justification for his account, some ref-
erences to Biblical narratives where God intervenes in the natural order. 
This might fit an account of miracles as interruptions of natural regulari-
ties and institution (for some reason and for some time) of another regular-
ity inexplicable on the basis of all knowledge one has of nature, but Scotus 
shows here - as mostly also elsewhere 3 - no concern for miracles, save for 
one exception, which comes in the context of his defense of the credibility 
of Holy Scripture in Ord. prol. p. 24• Scotus has at least three cases in view: 
(a) the standing still of the sun (and of the moon), or the prevention of sun-
set, at the time of Joshua (Joshua 10.12-13); (b) the three young men walk-
ing unharmed in the fiery furnace at the time of the prophet Daniel (Daniel 
3.19-50); (c) the sudden eclipse of the sun on the occasion of Christ's death 
on the cross (Luke 23.44-45). All these events contradicted the principles of 
geometry/astronomy, when contradicting the principles of geometry/as-
tronomy means going against the principles of natural science as they are 
currently established and known". The reference in these Biblical cases to 
"different" or "irregular" movements of heavenly bodies -just like "differ-
ent" or "irregular" actions in other paradigmatic Biblical cases, such as 
Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, which serve to justify them morally 6 - inspire 
Scotus to affirm that it coheres with a rational view of God that He, as 
supreme legislator proceeding through contingent volitions in respect to 
what is ad extra, has full control over regularities of the physis, which, for 
this reason, are only generally the case. 
" On this point, see G. Berceville, Du miracle au surnaturel. De Thomas d'Aquin 
a Duns Scot: un changement de problematique, in: 0. Boulnois; E. Karger; J.-L. Solere; 
G. Sondag (eds.), Duns Scot a Paris 1302-2002, p. 575-579. 
• See Ordinatio prol. p. 2 q. un. n. 113-116 (ed. Vat. I: 77-82). 
' See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 17 (ed. Soder: 198): "Ad aliud concedo quod non est 
scientia simpliciter necessaria, sed ut in p}uribus tantum. Perrnittit enirn res ut in 
pluribus operari secundum motus suos et secundum ordinem ad eo dispositum. 
Aliquando tamen, praetermittendo ilium ordinem, agit secundum alium ordinem. Patet 
de statione solis in tempore Iosue et de tribus pueris in igne et eclipsi solis in mort.e 
Christi, quod fuit contra principia geometriae". 
"See in this respect the out.standing monograph by I. Mandrella, Das lsaak-Opfi•r. 
Historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Rationalitat und Wandelbarheit des Natur-
rechts in der mittelalterlichen Lehre uom n.atiirlichen Gesetz, 2002 (p. 132•150 for Duns 
Scotus). 
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And this should justify Scotus's strong conclusion about the knowledge 
of nature whenever nature can be understood as some thing, process or cau-
sation subject to absolute power and therefore to a modified ordinate power 
- no matter what aspect of nature is being considered, and not in the first 
instance because the study of physis, as we can find in Aristotle's account, is 
in itself the study of universals that are "enmattered" 7• Knowledge of nature 
is contingent and "factually as for the most part of the cases" (de facto ut in 
pluribus) because any aspect of nature is a consequence of some contingent 
ordinate power effected by God. Here - but not elsewhere, as I pointed out 
above 8 - Scotus agrees with Henry of Ghent when Henry concludes 9 that 
there is no "scientific knowledge" of the contingent but knowledge "factually 
as for the most part of the cases", and at the same time both would express 
the judgment that there is only knowledge of the contingent when there is 
knowledge of nature at all, for the generalized probability of regularities in 
nature indicate that they are, in the end, irreducibly contingent aspects of the 
world 10• Scotus, in agreement with Henry, reduces contingency in nature to 
generalized probability, but Scotus explains them metaphysically through 
absolute power and through God's contingent decision to institute an order 
that is logically possible and logically changeable. The source of contingency 
(or rather probability) has no explicit relationship with matter or the very 
influence of matter in the universals of physics. 
7 See below in the Concluding Remarks. 
8 See above in the Introduction. 
"There is a significant difference here between the text edited by J. R. Soder and 
the one edited by A. B. Wolter and 0. Bychkov; see Rep. exam. I Ad. 44 q. 1 n. 17 (ed. 
Wolter and Bychkov: 536): "Sic ergo modo respondeo, sicut heri in quadam quaestione, 
quad non est scientia de contingent.ibus nisi de facto ut in pluribus". 1Nhere J. R. Soder's 
edition reads "Henricus", A. B. Walter's and 0. Byvhkov's edition reads "heri". Because 
of this A B. Wolter and 0. Bychkov refer naturally (p. 536, note 7) to what Scotus had 
affirmed in Rep. exam. I A d. 42 q. 2 n. 32, where he affirms indeed that, in a particu-
lar sense, knowledge of things in nature is only "for the most part of the cases". How-
ever, Scotus's account and concern about the knowledge of nature in that last passage 
is different than in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 17; see R. H. Pich, Onipotencia e conhe-
cimento cientffico, in: C. A. Lertora-Mendoza (coord.), op. cit., p. 1-17 (and also below 
in Concluding Remarks). I follow also here, for convenience, the reading given by J. R. 
Soder; see the next footnote, although the editor offers no reference to the possible work 
of Henry of Ghent where this opinion was presented. W. J. Courtenay, Capacity and 
Volition, p. 99-100, gives a brief account of Henry of Ghent's view on potentia ordinata. 
and potentia absoluta, quoting several texts as sources, such as Quodlibeta II q. 2 et q. 
7, IV q. 3, VIII q. 3, and XI q. 2. Although Henry recognized in some passages that there 
are other possibilities that can prevail "in the common course of nature", allowing also 
"occasional supernatural adjustments in that order", his view on potentia absoluta 
showed a reluctance to apply it to God in face of the danger of comp1·omising God's im-
mutability and simplicity. I am unable to find any passage of Henry's work that corre-
sponds to the contents of what Scotus was saying in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 17, and 
find no indication of that in the monograph by S. P. Marrone, Truth and Scientific 
Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent, 1985. 
10 See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 17 (ed. Soder: 198): "Sic ergo modo respondeo, sicut 
Henricus in quadam quaestione, quad non est scientia de contingentibus nisi de facto 
ut in pluribus". 
SCOTUS ON ABSOLUTE POWER AND KNOWLEDGE (Co,.tinu1>tion and end) 19 
JV. An Excursus on Scotus's Cosmology 
For this reason, this seems to be the right moment to emphasize that 
Scotus is placing contingency and probability in an area - i.e., cosmology-
where Aristotle himself never imagined to place them. The grounds for this 
that we have thus far considered have been basically metaphysical-specu-
lative, i.e., it'is a consequence of the way that a first and single necessary 
being ex se - and "omnipotent" in the theological sense - can relate to what 
is ad extra in respect to it. In Lectura II d. 14 q. 4 and Ordinatio d. 14 q. 1, 
which are parts of his two repeated treatises on cosmology as traditionally 
understood 11, Scot us discusses how "philosophers" and "theologians" can 
possibly conceive the nature of celestial bodies and their respective heav-
ens. Initially, he points out that philosophers' and theologians' views differ 
sharply on these subjects, even though the theologians' standpoint in those 
texts might perfectly be taken as a "rational" or even as a "natural" stand-
point. This observation constitutes an important part of the background to 
Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 and thus deserves a brief discussion, despite the fact 
that the conclusion of the heavens' and heavenly bodies' changeability in 
our Reportatio distinction is never presented by Scotus as a view of the 
''theologians". The changeability of celestial bodies is actually not explained 
at all in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 in terms of an analysis of their own essen-. 
tial constitution as material substances. We may well find some informa-
tion about this particular issue in the account of prime matter in Lectura 
and Ordinatio II d. 14. 
In Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 and Ord. II d. 14 q. 1, Scotus addresses the ques-
tion "whether a heavenly body is a simple essence" 12• He distinguishes ra-
dically the opinion of Aristotle (the "Philosopher") and Averroes (the 
' 1 I can only point out here that Scotus is clearly conscious of the account of the 
heavens delivered by Aristotle and the Greek tradition. From sources such as 
Metaphysica XII 6-8, Physica VIII, and De caelo II 3, it would be possible to reconstruct 
the structure of the cosmos departing from the totality of perceptible movements up to 
a distinguished form, that of the no-longerchangeable-in-any-way-but-eternal mover -
since it is not possible that everything is changeable, for movement and time have no 
beginning. The movemen~required by this account, which is continuous and eternal, can 
only be explained as a circular movement, to be attributed first of all to the fixed stars, 
and afterwards also to the movements of the planets, sun, and moon. Such movements 
affect every change in material sublunary world. Although a geocentric world view would 
demand in the end a very complex account of movements over a large number of celes-
tial spheres, it suffices to point out that Scotus, relying strongly on Ptolomeus's 
Almagesto and Alpetragius's De motibis caelorum, in Ord. II d. 14 q. 2 n. 25-55 (ed. Vat. 
VIII: 254-269), Whether there is some moueable heauen other than the starry heauen, both 
affirms that "all astronomers agree that there are at least nine heavens" and that ''they 
disagree whether there is more than nine [heavens]". 
12 See Duns Scotus, Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 37-38 (ed. Vat. XIX: 126): "37. Utrum cor-
pus caeleste sit simplex essentia. 38. Respondeo quod aliter respondendum est ad hanc 
quaestionem secundum sententiam Philosophi et Commentatoris, et aliter secundum 
theologiam". See also Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 1-2 (ed. Vat. VIII: 243). 
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"Commentator") from the point-of-view of theology. In brief, Scotus affirms 
as a common philosophical opinion that a celestial body is an "extended 
simple nature" in respect of quantity. Within it, matter has no potency to 
form. This conclusion is derived from the premise that sky and heavenly 
bodies are formally necessary (and sempiternal) and cannot not be 1:i_ Mat-
ter as such, i.e., "prime matter" taken generally, would bring to those bodies 
a receptive potency to some opposite of the form that they presently have, 
and anything that has matter in that sense could have not been 14. Heaven 
and heavenly bodies cannot have such matter, because having it implies 
formal corruptibility, the intrinsic principle of being and not being. In 
heaven there is matter for movement, in the sense that it is moved only in 
place: this "matter" differs from the sublunary "matter" in the "four ele-
ments" (such as "fire", which is itself corruptible in this way because it 
emerges out of a matter that is subject to different forms). It is a matter 
only "in respect to place" 15, but by no means "in respect to substantial 
form" 16, which is for Scotus the other element of an individual material com-
posite or substance 17. 
Accordingly there is no external agent that can corrupt the heavens. For 
Averroes, as he declares in his De substantia orbis, the celestial body is there-
fore a simple, ingenerable and incorruptible body. It is material, but it is not 
of potential matter, and one can attach to it a potency or intelligence of move-
ment, although this intelligence is not its form - nor is it its form in the sense 
of that which resides in it as an efficient power in relation to matter 18. Be-
cause of this, and following Aristotle's teaching in De Caelo I, a celestial body 
i:J See Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 39 (ed. Vat. XIX: 127): "Secundum Philosophum est 
dicendum quod est simplex natura extensa per quantitatem, non habens materiam 
partem sui, quae sit in potentia ad formam, - et hoc, quia ponunt quod caelum sit ex se 
formaliter neeessarium nee potest non esse, quod tamen sequeretur si materiam habe-
ret. Nee video necessitatem ponendi duas materias primas alterius rationis". 
14 See Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 r1. 40 (ed. Vat. XIX: 128): "Item, secundum Philosophum 
IX Metaphysicae, omnis potentia passiva et receptiva est potentia contradictionis, quia 
non est intelligibile quod sit potentia receptiva et tamen quod determinetur ad unum; 
si ergo in caelo esset materia, ipsa esset in potentia ad oppositum illius formae, et sic 
posset non esse, - quocl non dicerent". 
'" See also Ord. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 7 (ed. Vat. VIII: 246-247): "Similiter, Philosophus 
non ponit materiam nisi propter potentialitatem ad mutationem; in caelo non est 
potentialitas mutat.ionis nisi ad 'ubi"'. 
16 See Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 41 (ed. Vat. XIX: 128-129): "Item, Philosophus non ponit 
materiam nisi propter transmutationem, quae 'fecit scire earn', ut ait Commentator VIII 
Metaphysicae; caelum non movetur nisi localiter, et ideo in caelo secundum eos tantum 
est materia ad ubi, non ad formam substantialem, - et hoc patet per Philosophum VIII 
Metaphysicae, ubi expresse loquitur de tali materia ad uni". Scotus also considers criti-
cally in those passages the philosophical opinion that the heaven is a "living being" 
(animatum, animal), where theological opinions are particularly divided; see Leet. II d. 
14 q. 4 n. 42-43, ,15-52 {ed. Vat. XIX: 129-130, 131-135); Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 9-11, 15-24 
(ed. Vat. VIII: 247-250, 251-254). 
'
7 On Scotus's account of substantial form, see R. Cross, The Physics of Duns 
,Scotus, p. 34-46. 
rn See Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 3 (ed. Vat.VIII: 243,244). 
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has matter (other than the derived four elements or anything out of the origi-
nal prime matter) and form, but it is not a composite substance, for it cannot 
change essentially either in terms of form or ofmatter 19• 
In an important passage (Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 5), Scotus, however, af-
firms as a philosopher that it is difficult to see on what basis the "other-
ness" of "meaning" or "nature" (alteritas rationis) in matter can be 
explained 20 • In light of the argument of the philosophers, one would have to 
concede that in the matter of celestial bodies and in the matter of all four 
elements and of what is composed by them, there are two different kinds of 
prime matter to be considered each time. For Scotus however the conse-
quence (Q) "There are two kinds of prime matter" cannot be true, therefore 
the antecedent (P) "The matter of celestial bodies is of another kind than 
all other material bodies" cannot be true either. His argument is not very 
easy to follow. He appeal$ to the premise that there are neither two primary 
final causes nor two primary efficient causes of two different natures, but 
rather only one, where the first final and efficient cause is of course God21• 
If the first cause is responsible for the generation of the matter from which 
things are made, then, on account of the unicity of the first cause, "prime 
matter" has to or at least can be in the same fundamental ontological sta-
tus - the one of being potential to form. The premise seems to affirm that 
prime matter is simply a unique fundamental reality which per se "does not 
exhibit objective potentiality" 22 and from which all things can be made. 
But there is perhaps a more precise account for Scotus of the very 
"quiddity" of prime matter. In a second argument against (P), the Subtle 
Doctor seems to defend the point of view that the essential reason why 
matter - prime matter - has a "potency to contradiction" or is a "principle 
of corruptibility" (ratio corruptibilitatis) is not because it has potency to 
another form or to form simpliciter; matter is the principle of corruptibil-
ity because it has "potency to the privation of the form it hasi' - a potency 
to the privation of form 23• Accordingly it seems that one can recognize a 
"' See Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 4 (ed. Vat. VIII: 244-245): "Ad ostendendum tamen 
incorruptibilitatem caeli ex se (quae hie supponitur), oportet procedere secundum via:;n 
Aristotelis I Caeli et mzmdi, et in hoc ostendere quod non sit alicuius naturae 
elementaris; qua incorruptibilitate ostensa, ostendetur carentia materiae, (..J". 
"° See Ord. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 5 (ed. Vat. VIII: 245): "Quod si dicatur materiam illam 
non esse eiusdem rationis cum materiis susceptivis diversarum formarum, et ideo non 
posse quantum est ex se transmutari ab una forma ad aliam, - hoc videtur incon• 
veniens". 
2
' See Ord. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 5 (ed. Vat. VIII: 246): "Primo quidem videtur difficile 
assignare unde sit ista alteritas rationis in hac materia et illa, quia tune essent duae 
materiae primae alterius et alterius rationis; consequens falsum, igitur et antecedens. 
Probatio falsitatis consequentis: non sunt duo fines primi nee duo efficientes primi alterius 
et alterius rationis; ergo similiter nee duae materiae primae alterius et alterius rationis". 
:ii That is, prime matter is not pure potentiality, but it has "an essence or quiddity" 
and its own properties; see. R. Cross, op. cit., p. 20s. (p. 17·23). 
13 See Ord. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 6 (ed. Vat. VIII: 246): "Secundo, data hac alteritate, 
saltem ista materia est in potentia ad hanc formam et ad privationem huius formae, ita 
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univocal prime matter even in respect to material substances whose essen-
tial part called "matter" actually never suffers any change or remains, for 
some feature of the established world, unchanged. Scotus seems to view 
prime matter as such as a principle of corruptibility under the description 
just given, and this is what prime matter is irrespective of there being or 
of there being able to be any form in the world to be received by and to 
change matter, and therefore this is what matter is logically-metaphysi-
cally before it becomes an essential part of a substance. 
Finally, in a third argument against (P), Scotus argues against Rich-
ard of Middleton and the thesis that celestial bodies do not change substan-
tially because their form satisfies entirely their matter's desire, and as a 
result the matter of celestial bodies is not subject to privation. Scotus's 
argument proceeds as follows: (Major Premise) "No form satisfies the en-
tire desire of its matter for other form, unless it gives to it an act that is the 
opposite to the privation of form". This premise should be understood in 
such a way that a form would concede to matter the act that is the opposite 
to matter's privation of form simpliciter, if that form would contain - at 
least virtually - all possible forms. But this is not what happens in celes-
tial bodies as material substances: (minor premise) "The form of a celestial 
body does not give to its matter the act that is the opposite of a privation 
such as the privation of the form of fire", an act that would be the form of 
fire itself; moreover, it is clear that the form of a celestial body does not give 
to its matter many other forms, such as the "intellective soul" for instance. 
(Conclusion): "The form of a celestial body does not satisfy the entire desire 
of its matter for other form" 24. Here Scotus does not merely declare the phi-
losophers' view on the constitution of celestial bodies in order to advocate 
for their simplicity, but he has also disputes their reasoning on the philo-
sophical level. 
If in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 Scotus considers it philosophically correct 
to affirm that every "created" existing being has to be conceived under the 
contingency of actuality and possibility/changeability, in Leet. II d. 14 q. 4 
and Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 he turns to those we may call "theologians" to express 
what such an account conceivably amounts to in respect of the heavens and 
celestial bodies. According to the theologians, heaven is composed of mat-
quod ista materia de se est in potentia contradictionis Iicet non ponatur in qua poten-
tia formae est; nunc autem non est materia per se ratio corruptibilitatis in quantum est 
in potentia ad formam aliam ab ea quam habet, sed in quantum est in potentia ad 
privationem formae quam habet". 
2• See Ord. II d. 14 q. 4 n. 8 (ed. Vat. VIII: 247): "Si dicatur quod materia in caelo 
non est in potentia contradictionis, quia forma sua complet totum eius appetitum, -
contra:. nulla forma complet totum appetitum materiae suae respectu alterius formae, 
nisi quia dat actum oppositum privationi illius formae; sed forma caeli non dat actum 
oppositum privationi formae ignis; igitur privatio formae ignis ibi manet. Probatio mi-
noris: nulla forma dat actum oppositum privationi cuiuscumque formae, nisi in se 
contineat omnes formas, saltem virtualiter; sed forma caeli non sic continet omnes 
formas, quia non animam intellectivam; ergo etc.". 
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i 
ter and form (Gn 1.1), and the "heaven" that was first made is the so-called 
"empyrean heaven" 2·5 and the angelic nature, and the "earth" that was first 
made is the "in-formed matter" from which everything else was made; this 
first "matter" resembles original "chaos" and is basically the same in all 
bodies contained in the empyrean heaven 26 • "Chaos" and "earth" are the 
basically passive "matter" of the empyrean heaven. Therefore, from the 
very same matter, celestial bodies and every other material thing were 
made. The "firmamentum" (Gn 1.6) therefore, which denotes the entire 
heaven where planets and fixed stars are found, was constituted from 
matter. Accordingly, it follows that all heavens have the same matter as the 
inferior elements - i.e., earth, air, fire, and water. Theologians thus must 
disagree with philosophers in respect to the principle that "the heaven is 
necessary and incorruptible" 27 • As the Biblical narratives confirm and help 
to sustain, the heaven ex se "can not-be", and if heaven and celestial bod-
ies are de iure but not de facto unchangeable, this is only because divine will 
keeps them in being. Thus, from a philosophical belief in the contingency 
of everything that is not God, and from a theological perspective on omnipo-
tence, the scientific context of matter in the supralunary cosmos has to be 
revisited rationally. Theologians search for reasons in order to balance, 
with desired consistency, their most firm and important metaphysical and 
theological convictions. 
There are reasons to affirm, therefore, that the matter to be found in 
heaven has is in itself also the potency to the forms of the four sublunary 
elements, and correlatively, that the matter of the four elements has in 
itself the potency to the form of heaven. As a consequence, it is both possible 
that the elements would gain the celestial form by the operation of the di-
vine will, and that the form of heaven would be preserved, uncorrupted in 
what respects its own matter, from receiving other forms - that is, from 
receiving other forms because of its intrinsic passivity. This state can ob-
tain only through the cooperation of the divine being 28• It is only a factual 
20 Uncontroversially, see H. Meinhardt, Empyreum, i11: Lexikon des Mittela,lters, 
p. 1898. The empyreus or "Empyrean Heaven" seems to be taken here as the «highest 
heaven» of ancient Greek cosmology and correspondingly, as the very way or the last 
passage to the divine; Scotus preserves in these passages the image of the empyreus as 
being both a dwelling-place of the angels and the source of creation. 
26 See Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 12 (ed. VIII: 250-251): "Secundum theologos ponenda est 
ibi materia, quia illud 'chaos' quod ponitur ab eis attigisse usque ad caelum empyreum, 
erat materia omnium corporalium contentorum a caelo empyreo; et etiam ponetur 
materia - secundum se et quantum est ex se - eiusdem rationis". 
27 See Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n, 13 (ed. Vat. VIII: 251): "Et ita habent ipsi discordare a 
Philosopho in hac propositione 'caelum est necessarium et incorruptibile': quantum enim 
est ex materia sua, esset simpliciter corruptibile, quia sibi inesset ilia potentia ad 
contrarium; quia tamen forma caeli non habet contrarium potens vincere istam formam, 
ideo non potest corrumpi ab agente naturali a quod recipit istam formam, vel etiam 
corrumpi in ignem vel aquam", 
"" See Leet. II d. 14 n. 44 (ed. Vat. XIX: 130-131): "Sed secundum theologiam est 
dicendum quad caelum est compositum ex materia et forma. Nam quando dicitur Gen. 1 
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circumstance that the form of heaven united with celestial matter is not 
deprived of its position by an opposite power, which would then surpass it 
and be received by that matter; the actual form of celestial body receives, 
as it were, a standing cooperation from the omnipotent and voluntary divine 
being, and not a regular opposition or even a continually instantiated op-
position. It is only under such a condition that the form of heaven cannot 
be surpassed in such a way that its matter, then, is corrupted by a natural 
agent - as it would be, for example, if its matter were corrupted through, 
say, the introduction of the form of fire or water. Nevertheless, such corrup-
tion is possible, since the matter to which all these bodies and elements are 
joined together is the same 29• Scotus thus affirms that the form of a celes-
tial body is strictly substantial, and its matter has the potency to privation 
of this form. 
V. Defining Scientific Knowledge ut in pluribus 
Presupposing this and returning to the analysis of Rep. exam. I d. 44 
q. 1, Scotus's position concerning the knowledge of nature can now be made 
even more precise, although the cost of precision is the interpretation of a 
difficult passage. He affirms on the one hand that (i) it is necessary and 
known through demonstration - and thus scientifically - that those celes-
tial bodies are "capable by nature" (apta nata) of the movements (that they 
currently have). He affirms on the other that (ii) that it happens contin-
gently that the same celestial bodies now move differently than in the time 
of Josiah or Ezechiel (2 Kings 20.8-11), or than in the way described in the 
lives of the (Old Testament) fathers (or patriarchs), that is, that they are 
entities that at one time are the case and at another time are not the case, 
In principio creauit Deus caelum et terram, ibi stat 'caelum' pro caelo empyreo, primo 
die creato, et pro natura angelica, 'terra' autem pro ilia materia informi ex qua fuerunt 
alia producta; et per consequens fir-mamentum quod est in medio aquarum - quod est 
totum caelum in quo sunt planetae et stellae fixae - fuit factum de illa materia; et ideo 
in caelo est materia eiusdem rationis cum materia istorum inferiorum, et per 
consequens ex se 'possibile non esse', conservatum tamen in esse voluntate divina; et 
est in potentia illa materia - quantum est ex se - ad fonnas istorum inferiorum et e 
contra. Seel tamen non est alia virtus potens transmutare materiam istorum inferiorwn 
ad formam caeli, nisi potentia divina". See also Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 14 (ed. Vat. VIII: 
251): "Sed tune videtur quod saltem caelum posset corrumpere et convertere ignem in 
caelum, quia virtus activa caeli excedit formam ignis (et est a forma caeli), et materia 
ignis est etiam capax formae caeli: igitur potest transmutare ad 'esse' ab agente tali. Et 
forte caelurn non potest alterare elementum ad qualitates convenientes tali corpori 
caelesti, et tamen forma illa in tantum dominatur illi materiae ut non possit ab aliquo 
altero alterari (recipiendo peregrinas impressiones), et per consequens nee corrumpi". 
29 See Ord. II d. 14 q. 1 n. 13 (ed. Vat. VIII: 251): "( .. .): quantum enim est ex ma-
teria sua, esset simpliciter corruptibile, quia sibi inesset illa potentia ad contrarium; 
quia tamen forma caeli non habet contrarium potens vincere istam formam, ideo non 
potest corrumpi ab agente naturali a quo recipit istam formam, vel etiam corrumpi in 
ignem vel aquam". 
SG'O'l'US ON ABSOLU'l'E POWER AND KNOWLEDGE: (Cont.inuation and end) 25 
and therefore the movement, conjunction and causation of celestial bodies 
cannot be known scientifically. How can we reconcile these two affirma-
tions? From what comes next in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 17, it seems that 
Scotus has in mind with point (i) some "strict regularity" or some "strict 
natural aptness to a certain regular movement", and with point (ii) some 
"randomness account" or "no regular movement account". The first situa-
tion is precluded by the recognition of God's absolute power, and the second 
situation would bring as a consequence not a failure in having scientific 
knowledge, but the impossibility of acquiring it. I think that Scotus wants 
to hold a middle position by saying that the knowledge of nature neither 
depends on strict regularity nor is precluded by factual randomness, but can 
really be knowledge of probabilities or of what happens "in the most part 
of the cases". After all, says Scotus, if sun and moon have similar move-
ments than the ones that were previously observed, that is, previously in 
the past and also until now, then - though recognizing the absolute power 
of an omnipotent being - one is entitled to affirm that there is some neces-
sity about them.1°, and that scientific knowledge can be obtained of them. 
'rhis is a reflection on the consequences of treating movements and pro-
cesses of physical bodies under logical and metaphysical possibilities. As a 
matter of fact anyone can know now of sun and moon as moving in the same 
way as if there were in respect of them no new movement or conjunction in 
comparison to the alternatives mentioned as having been the case at the 
times of Josiah and EzechieP 1• However recognizing, in the way Scotus 
suggests, a logical-metaphysical changeability in the processes of nature -
even if this changeability is never actually verified -anyone is supposed to 
experience and know such processes as regularities and is also justified in 
attributing a relative necessity to that knowledge, because of the strong 
probability of the known thing 32 • Nature and the knowledge ofit reflect no 
random disposition. Both change and the possibility of change in some as-
'
10 This seems to be a very simple account of obtaining probable generalizations or 
probable universal truths departing from particular sufficient and representative cases, 
that is, as a conclusion of a correct enumerative induction. Accordingly, "probability" can 
be viewed as the quality of the truth-character of a given universal or at least highly 
generalized proposition - a quality that suffices for holding it as true and even as a 
conditionally necessary truth, although not as an unconditionally necessary truth. The 
more one enumerates successfully similar particular cases, at different times and in 
relevant different situations, the more the generalization gains probability as its truth-
character - and thus "statistically" and "significantly". Though its premises are true, 
the conclusion of such an argument - the probable generalization itself - can of course 
be false; see Steven French, Ciencia, p. 24-30; Wesley C. Salmon, Logik, p. 163-176. 
"
1 See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 17 (ed. Soder: 198): "Sed quod sint sic apta nata 
ad tales motus, hoc est necessarium et scitum sic demonstrative. Sed quod modo sint 
aliter mota ut tempore Iosae vel Ezechiae, vel sicut legitur in vitis patrum de sole, hoc 
est contingenter factum, et ideo haec non possunt sciri demonstrative. Sed si habent 
similes motus quales deprehensi sunt sol et luna habere prius, tune sequitur de neces-
sitate scientia. Unde in eodem aspectu se habent solet luna modo ac si non fuisset ibi 
aliquis novus motus vel nova coniunctio temporibus praedictis". 
32 See note 30 above. 
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pect - simple or connected to a larger set of altered aspects - are to be 
viewed as an exception against the background of some regular order of 
natural movements and events. Truly, it is only against such a regular 
background that one can both (i) account for exceptions and (ii) have 
scientia rd in pluribus. 
·At the end of his analysis, Scotus confirms this same point through the 
counterfactual assumption that a new movement and a new constellation 
of heavenly bodies takes place. If that is so, then one (sole) body will be 
moved over the entire heaven, and the body once moved will be "immedi-
ately" (subito) brought back to its place in order to preserve uniformity. 
Since the movement would be an exception, it is necessary to presuppose 
the maintenance of the background. So a new order instituted by an abso-
lute power is no chaos or confusion; they are just exceptions or changes 
within what holds for the most part of the cases. Although chaos in nature 
- or at least high degrees ofrandomness - are surely logical and metaphysi-
cal possibilities, Scotus seems to think that there is no reason to argue for 
the idea that God would establish a generally chaotic or random general 
arrangement of natural processes, where nothing could be naturally known, 
not even by probability. Granting absolute power, Scotus does not abandon 
the idea of a residual harmony to which changes later return. This seems 
to be precisely what happens when one accepts the belief that many hold 
concerning special cases of the intervention in nature of divine absolute 
power, and this should hold also ifit would be the case that, by retracting 
the movement of one body, divine power would retract the movement of other 
connected celestial bodies, in order not to destroy harmony in the new order 
established. Harmony of celestial bodies, conjunctions and regular move-
ments (cause-effect relationships) is therefore the background against which 
exceptions stand out- it is not the exceptions that are known scientifically, 
but rather their harmonic background, and this in spite of them, In an addi-
tional sense, particular interventions may require more complex changes -
apparently they can only happen within a context of alterations and, accord-
ingly, within a context of various connected interventions. This implies not 
only that even an omnipotent being would have to observe those relations -
like complex cause-effect relations - in order that particular changes prevail, 
so that an absolute pmver of change would have to apply regressively to a 
whole set of connected celestial bodies; but it also implies that even in com-
plex changes, since they presuppose the change of several connected bodies, 
there is a residual harmony or coherence within change itself: changes by an 
absolute power within conjunctions of celestial bodies' movements require 
therefore a new coherence, and institute a new harmony 33• 
'" See Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 n. 17 (ed. Soder: 200): "Quod patet quia sic e contra 
movebatur unum corpus in totum cae!um vel corpus motum subito revertebatur ad 
locum suum ad habendum uniformitatern. Nam creditur a quibusdam quod sicut Deus 
fecit specia!iter circa solem, sic de aliis corporibus caelestibus retrogradando ne solve-
retur harmonia". 
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I believe that all presuppositions for a definition of scientific knowledge 
ut in pluribus in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 1 have now been given. It relates 
explicitly to knowledge of events in nature: 
SK ut-in-pluribus def.: Scientific knowledge "for the most part of the cases" is 
the knowledge of objects of nature such as celestial bodies, movements of ce-
lestial bodies, movements of conjunctions of celestial bodies and therefore 
cause-effect relationships in the movements of celestial bodies that correspond 
to a contingently instituted order of natural happenings, by an omnipotent 
power, and that can at any instant, generally through exceptional causations, 
be changed by the absolute power of an omnipotent being, in a way that does 
not however preclude the regularity or relative necessity, and therefore the 
probability, of those happenings. 
Scotus finally replies to the objection advanced in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. 
1 n. 5, which summarized the critical reflection on astronomy/geometry by 
positing that there is no "natural science", where one understands by "natu-
ral science" a knowledge of material things according to the movements of 
heavenly bodies. Apparently Scotus was thinking about astronomical phe-
nomena described in Aristotle's Meteorologica. And the fifth objection in-
voked the consequence that "fire" would not be more likely generated in one 
part of the heaven than any other element would. The accusation that there 
would not be "natural science" any more has by now been dismissed by 
Scotus. As a matter of fact, the first part of the fifth objection, which pre-
supposes those phenomena of the space between earth and heaven, was 
theoretically answered through the last part of Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 17. 
Scotus then answers straightforwardly the fifth objection by affirming that 
he disagrees with its terms. The scientist of nature does not say that more 
fire is generated in one part of heaven than in another part of heaven. The 
"naturalis" only affirms that, when the sun approaches one part of heaven, 
more fire is generated in that part to which the sun approaches closer 34 • 
Scotus's remark do not seem to be motivated by his own reflections on ab-
solute power, but rather to reflect a criticism grounded on a more careful 
interpretation of Aristotle's text itself. 
Concluding Remarks 
Is the scientific knowledge ut in pluribus developed by Scotus in Rep. 
exam. Id. 44 q. 1 a variation on an Aristotelian theme? I think it is, but here 
only in a broad sense. As the lexical synthesis by 0. Hoffe indicates:is, in 
Analytica posteriora I 30, 87b19-27 the idea of a knowledge hos epi to poly 
34 See Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 n. 18 (ed. Soder: 200): "Ad ultimum dico quod naturalis 
non <licit plus de igne in tali parte caeli generari quam in alia, sed <licit quod 
appropinquante sole plus generatur de igne cui magis appropinquat". 
"" See 0. Hoffe, hos epi to poly / meistens, in der Regel, in: 0. Hoffe (Hrsg.), 
Aristoteles-Lexikon, p. 264-265. 
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is joined to one of three types of true propositionsa 6 ; (i) there are necessary 
propositions, where the connection between subject and predicate is true "in 
all cases" (kata pantos), "essentially" (kath' hauto) and "absolutely" 
(katholou>37. (ii) There are true propositions merely contingent or proposi-
tions "by chance" (cases of tyche), where the subject and the predicate are 
joined occasionally 38 or in a causally less determinate way ("by chance" and 
"from itself or spontaneously") 311, as, for example, "A Greek man is a mer-
chant". (iii) True propositions "for the most part of the cases" are those 
propositions that have only great probability. They are "universally quan-
tified", however, and their grounding rests on the nature of the object, for 
example, that a man, as time passes, turns grey 40 , that a beard grows on his 
jaw' 11, that honeywater has healing properties for patients sick with fever"2, 
etc. 
True propositions "for the most part of the cases" do not hold, for 
Aristotle, with necessity (with unconditional or haplos necessity), because 
"deviations" that have "casual' validity and are merely accidents can inter-
pose13. Therefore, it can happen that honeywater contains materials that 
are harmful to the patient, or else that the patient suffers not only from 
fever but also from further diseases, for which honey is by no means recom-
mended. Since the material world is composed by form and matter (and 
material aspects are present in the essences and definitions of universals, 
where there is some natural "resistance" of matter in respect to form, or 
where the natural "indeterminateness of matter" is revealed, especially in 
the universals of physics or of nature lato sensu, for the reason that they are 
"essentially enmattered")H, additional conditions - purely accidentalizing 
conditions - can appear on the scene. Because of these reasons, and gener-
ally, statements about physis (including specifically the animals) and about 
human praxis, in contradistinction to mathematics, are "true" only "usu-
ally", although in a qualified sense they are nomological and offer causal ex-
36 See alsoAnalytica posteriora I 4 (ed. Meiner, 1998: 325-331; Physica II 4-5 (ed. 
Meiner 1987: 69-79); Metaphysica VI 2, 1026b27-a28 (ed. Meiner, ;11989: 256-259). 
"
7 The Aristotelian ideal of causal explanation, understood in this way as "uncon-
ditional scientific knowledge" (C. D. C. Reeve), is repeated by Scotus in his first model 
of scientia, which was described above in the Introduction; see also R. H. Pich, Der 
Begl'iff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus, 1.5.2.2 and 
1.5.2.3. 
38 See Metaphysica VI 2, 1027all-. (ed. Meiner, ·'1989: 258-259). 
3
" See A. F. Koch, tyche / Zufall, in: 0. Roffe (Hrsg.), Aristoteles-Lexikon, p. 610f. 
41
' See Analytica priora I 13, 32b5-13 (ed. Meiner 1998: 54-57). 
"'See Analytica posteriora II 13, 96a8-19 (ed. Meiner 1998: 490-493). 
'" See Metaphysica VI 2, 1027a22-24 (ed. Meiner, "1989: 258-259). 
•13 See the meaning of symbebelws in Metaphysica V 30, l025a15-21 (ed. Meiner, 
"1989: 246-247). See De generatione et corruptione II 6, 333b5-8 (ed. W. D. Ross 1970 
(repr.)). 
44 See Metaphysica VI 1, 1025b26-I026a6; VI 2, 1027a8-28 (ed. Meiner, "1989: 250-
253, 258-259). See C. D. C. Reeve, Practices of Reason. Aristotle's Nicomachean !Ethics, 
p. 21. 
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planation among universals 45 , just like, once again, the relationship be-
tween honeywater and fever, a grown man and his grey hairs, etc. And 
nonetheless episteme seems to extend both to what is "always'' the case and 
to what is the case "most of times" 46: what is demonstrable extends to the 
hos epi to poly 47 • According to Reeve, the explanation given in such relation-
ship between universals was admitted already by Aristotle as "probabiliz-
ing" (Rhetorica 1402620-21), where "ifF probabilizes G, then it will hold for 
the most part that Fs are Gs"·13• Taking a characteristic sense for the things 
that are endechomena, i.e. ''possible" or "contingent", that could therefore 
happen differently, we do not exclude necessity entirely from those "proba-
bilizing" causal links, but rather unconditional necessity. Thus, on Reeve's 
explanation, 
"(. .. ): if F and G are thus related, 'All Fs are Gs' is necessarily true. Probabi-
lizing is a necessary, law-like relation between universals that guarantees that 
the corresponding universally quantified propositions will be for the most part 
true: if F and G are thus related, 'All Fs are Gs' will necessarily hold for the 
most part". 
And this holds for the whole syllogism: 
"( ... ): if F probabilizes G, and G probabilizes H, then F probabilizes H" 19• 
Aristotle does not seem to ascribe the limitation "for the most part of 
the cases" to statements of principles of absolute forms, or to statements of 
causality that are expressions of the theory of the "four causes", or, in the 
domain of ethics, to determinations of"essence", for example, of happiness 
and virtue - but rather to the principles of universals of physics or of na-
ture that are "essentially enmattered"" 0 • In ethics, however, there is a wide 
room for knowledge ut in pluribus - after all, as the well known example 
illustrates, wealth and courage can contribute to eudaimonia, but it can 
happen that, if that is the case, they do it more "casually" than "necessar-
ily", for they contribute to eudaimonia more "roughly" and more "in out-
line"51. In what measure this grounding of ethical statements makes 
"deliberation" indispensable and in what measure universal laws of justice 
are just only "for the most part of the cases", which is a reason why the vir-
.,,, As Lindsay Judson, Chance and 'Always or For the Ilfost Part' in Aristotle, in: 
Lindsay Judson (ed.), Aristotle's Physics -A Collection of Essays, p. 84, rightly empha-
sizes, Aristotle "associates 'for the most part' with 'by nature'". Cf. id. ibid., p. 85ss., 
97s, 
16 See Metaphysica VI 2, 1027a20-21 (ed. Meiner, "1989: 258-259); Physica II 5, 
197a19-20 (ed. Meiner 1987: 76-77; C. D. C. Reeve, op, cit., p. 13f. 
·
11 See Analytica posteriora 87619-22, 96al 7-19 (ed. Meiner 1998: 430-4,ll, 490-491). 
48 See C. D. C, Reeve, op. cit., p. 15f. See also 0. Porchat Pereira, Ciencia e dialetica. 
em Arist6teles, p. 180-181. 
,,,, See C. D. C. Reeve, op. cit., p. 16. 
50 See 0. Hoffe, hos epi to poly/ meistens, in der Regel, in: 0. Roffe (Hrsg.), op. cit., 
p. 264-265. 
"1 See for instance Ethica Nicomachea I 1, 1094618-21 (ed. Meiner, 11985: 2-3). 
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tue of "equity" is needed, is not our present subject 52 . The point to be 
stressed is the different nuance that Scotus gives to knowledge ut in 
pluribus. He does not deal with cases of ethics as a practical science; he also 
does not connect statements valid ut in pluribus to principles, but rather, 
in accordance with the outcome of this topic of investigation departing from 
Rep. exam. Id. 42 q. 1-2, only to conclusive propositions in which so-called 
absolute proper properties, not proper-aptitudinal nor purely accidental 
properties, are predicated. And in Rep. exam. Id. 42 q. 1-2 the relevant 
connections were then about purely essentialist or metaphysical enunciates 
{as they would be about "natural kinds" such as homo, equus and arbor) or, 
still, about enunciates of natural philosophy in a general sense (such as 
those about homo qua anima rationalis)"·1. The conclusion of the topic 
scientia ut in pluribus in Rep. exam. I d. 44 q. I is thus again innovative 
and, when compared to Aristotle's account of natural science and condi-
tional necessity, differs from it. But the form of the science ut in pluribus 
here studied does not properly point to a change in the picture of models of 
scientia offered previously by Scotus (see Introduction) - it rather adds to 
that picture a model of scientia naturalis not previously offered 5'1. 
In the account of ordinate and absolute power by an omnipotent being, 
it is affirmed both (a) that the heavenly bodies' movements are not uncon-
ditionally necessary and not unconditionally determinate, and (b) that the 
regularity - and hence probability or conditional necessity - that they have 
as the residual background of exceptions is not explained by matter-and-
form relationships in substances whose actuality is accountable through 
hylomorphism. Although Scotus - along the lines of moral-theological cases 
or general rules and exceptional revocations - seems to ground such "regu-
larity" and "conditional necessity" not only through the account of the irre-
ducible contingency of physical nature, but also emphatically through the 
assumption that exceptions have happened and indeed do happen, the as-
sumption of the radically contingent constitution of every existing thing 
outside God's essence or the constitutive divine cooperation in maintaining 
an order of things (despite God's possessing, at the same time, the power 
to change it) does seem to suffice for "regularity" and "conditional neces-
sity". "Ut in pluribus" works therefore as a subclass of ontic necessity ex-
plained both by the real-possibility and factual-contingency of non-divine 
things and the absolute power of an omnipotent being. In a derivate sense, 
"" Ibid., III 5 (ed. Meiner, 4 1985: 51-53); see C. D. C. Reeve, op. cit., p. 77-78, 79-
91. See also 0. Roffe, Ethik als praktische Philosophie - Methodische Uberlegungen (I 
1, 1094a22-1095a13), in: 0. Roffe (HrsgJ, Aristoteles - Die nihomachische Ethik, p. 19-
30 (especially p. 24-26). · 
"" See again R. H. Pich, Onipotencia e conhecimento cientffico, in: C. A. Lertora-
Mendoza (coord.), op. cit., p. 1-17. 
54 This account of science is not offered, I insist, in those contexts where certain and 
real knowledge "through experience" (per experientiam), established in conjunction with 
a priori principles of sense experience, grounds a form of knowledge ut in pluribus of 
nature; see the final paragraphs below. 
SCO'l'US ON ABSOLUTE POWER AND KNOWLEDGE (Continuatinn and end) 31 
"ut in pluribus" works as a subclass of alethic necessity, and grounds a par-
ticular level of epistemic habit. Furthermore, even if one takes for the sake 
of the argument those Biblical narratives as historical events, the fact that 
their explanation, and indeed that of any possible fact of nature, rests on 
the possibility of being otherwise that accompanies each decision by a "uni-
versal Legislator" (where the second part of the disjunction or "can will -.a", 
"can not-will a" or "can non-will a" can be touched at any time by a corre-
sponding active absolute power) favors a view of the conditional necessity 
in question that is not basically but only secondarily "statistical". After all, 
the "not-always" of the ut in pluribus is not reducible to an explanation in 
terms of "it is otherwise at some instant of time", but it is reducible to an 
explanation in terms of "it is possible to be otherwise at some instant of 
time". This characterization alone, it seems, would suffice to "probabilize" 
a given regular state of affairs. This reinforces the thesis that necessity ut 
in pluribus is "strong" probability, and scientia ut in pluribus is "strongly" 
probable. Absolute power does not presuppose randomness. 
Based on the sources investigated here, there is no reason to think that 
the role of the subject/object in scientifically acquired knowledge has been 
modified when compared to the previous models of scientia in Lectura and 
Ordinatio; there is no major concern about that point, and the basic differ-
ence in the scientific habit considered in Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 is that the 
subject/object is not a form-essence but a physical object. Scotus manifestly 
treats a habit such as "astronomy" as a scientia naturalis: in the way that 
natural regularities are known there is certain knowledge, but not uncon-
ditionally necessary knowledge, because they are and are known - if they 
are known - only "for the most part of the cases". This has to mean that 
certainty is disjoined from strict necessity, and necessity for epistemic pur-
poses is dis joined from strict necessity too. In scientific know ledge of physi-
cal bodies, and surely of their causative-effective relationships generally, 
one can only achieve knowledge with certainty and qualified necessity de-
parting from principles to conclusions: they are all under a modality of 
necessity that does not couple with the modality of necessity that one finds 
when he knows the principles of natural kinds or forms-essences such as 
homo as a rational soul. By interpreting in this way each basic true propo-
sition to which knowledge ut in pluribus is attached, one can bring back into 
consideration the epistemic conditions advanced in Ord. prol. n. 20855 , 
which seem to hold for the case at issue in the following way: (a) certainty, 
(b) qualified necessity (under divine permission or cooperation and God's 
power of change), (c) evidence, and (d) discursivity. Therefore, model (1) 
discussed in the Introduction, in spite of the significant reinterpretation of 
condition (b), is not only structurally preserved, but it remains finally un-
touched. As it happens, refinements are instead introduced into model (5), 
which was not even proposed as a model for scientific knowledge in se but 
rather as a model for another kind of scientia. The focus of Rep. exam. Id. 
"" See Introduction above. 
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44 q. 1 does not lie on any account of subordination theory 56, and this sug-
gests that, in the grand scheme, any middle science will continue to owe its 
scientific character to the premises of pure mathematics. What is signifi-
cantly modified, at least for the natural science of"astronomy", is the logical 
status of their principles, irrespective of the full explanation that they find 
in mathematics. 
In Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1 there is also no concern about how physical 
bodies are knowable "through experience", but this certainly means that, 
what is generally valid for any cognition "vera et sincera" obtained per 
experientiam, as exposited by Scotus in Ord. Id. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n, 235-237, 240-
24557, is valid for "astronomy" as a middle science, not for "geometry'' as a 
mathematical subordinating science. In that text, Scotus treats the truths 
obtained by reasoned induction, where induction consists in the combina-
tion of repeated observations with one or more principles known per se. In 
knowledge through experience, just as with knowledge presupposed by a 
middle science, one is not concerned with those principles per se known, 
which are universal and independent of sense experiences, One is rather 
concerned with truths taken from repeated observation of similar phenom-
ena and in respect of a cognition of the physical world and its laws. Since 
they are observations not about all particular cases, but at most about a 
large number of them, one can ask whether generalization is epistemica1ly 
legitimate. Scotus works then with two ideas: (i) generalization is legiti-
mate, in virtue of the principle "everything that happens in the most part 
of the cases [ut in pluribus] by some non-free cause is the natural effect of 
that cause" 58; (ii) generalization alone does not suffice to ground a principle 
known per se, for this is known through its terms alone. And so Scotus ad-
mits a distinction in natural sciences between a general principle per se and 
a particular law through experience 5\ From the epistemic side this account 
seems to remain fully valid for Scotus, but from the logical-metaphysical 
side the "particular laws" of nature or the laws of celestial bodies, despite 
being their a priori rational mental framework, stay inevitably under prob-
ability and conditional necessity alone, and this happens not because those 
ut in pluribus generalizations work only over samples, but rather because 
,;c, See R. H. Pich, Scotus on Absolute Power and Knowledge, in: Patristica et 
Mediaevalia, p. 5-6, note 21. 
~
7 Scotus never strictly talks about "scientific knowledge" (scientia) in that context, 
although he talks there of knowledge ut in pluribus; as far as I know an account of 
natum.les scientiae as scientific know ledge u.t in plun:&us appears formally for the first 
time in Rep. exam. Id. 42 q. 2 and Id. 44 q. 1 - in the accounts of scientia in Lectura 
and Ordinatio, Scotus usually does not seem to give mom for any kind of necessity, in 
those places where necessity is needed for defining scientific knowledge. that comes in 
terms of a "conditional necessity". 
5
" See Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3 p. 1 q. 4 n. 23fi (ed. Vat. III: 142): "(. .. ): 
'quidquid evenit ut in pluribus ab aliqua causa non libern, est effectus naturalis illius 
causae"'; id. ibid. n. 240 (ed. Vat. III: 146): '''( ... J: quod evenit in pluribus ab aliquo, i!lud 
est causa naturalis eius, si non sit causa libera"'. 
,;;, See G, Sondag, Duns Scot. La m,!taphysique de la si11gularite, p. 20-28. 
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through ut in pluribus generalizations, from each token up to the most wide 
set of tokens, it is always only de potentia absoluta changeable things that 
are known, and it is always only de potentia ordinata et ordinata probable 
things that are being actually generalized. 
What was previously said about the notion of scientia in Rep. exam. I 
d. 42 q. 260 can now, after the discussion about scientia in Rep. exam. I d. 44 
q. 1, be repeated: Scotus examines scientific knowledge because ofa pro-
found conviction about reality in its absolute terms - namely, that reality 
is above all contingency. Thus a revised metaphysics requires a revision of 
epistemology. 
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ABSTRACT 
In Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1, Scotus offers a discussion, unique within his work, 
of cases in which a traditional account of "scientific knowledge" of nature is trans-
formed into a knowledge "as in most cases" (ut in pluribus). Underlying this par-
ticular model of scientific knowledge is an account of God's omnipotence and 
absolute power. With the aim of explaining this model, this study explores certain 
fundamental theoretical elements of Rep. exam. Id. 44 q. 1, i.e., definitions of di-
vine omnipotence and absolute power, and Scotus's general theory of contingency, 
as well as the background context of contingency and divine scientia in Rep. exam. 
I d. 38-44. The stage is then set for the introduction of the idea of a knowledge "as 
in most cases", which Scotus had likely encountered in Analytica posteriora. Pos-
sible connections between omnipotence, absolute power, and knowledge ut in 
pluribus are then analyzed. Because Scotus's model of scientia ut in pluribus de-
pends heavily on a critical view of the regularity of the movements of heavenly 
bodies, some notes on Scotus's cosmology are offered, as well as a comparison be-
tween the scope ofScotus's "probable" knowledge of nature and Aristotle's view of 
the same within many passages of his opera concerning the knowledge of physical 
universals. 
